

# Land Forces Planning Factors

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# Purpose

- Derive planning factors that will assist in the design and utilization of Army and Marine Corps expeditionary forces.
- Use experience in OIF (Iraq) and OEF (Afghanistan) as the basis for the factors
- Use available data for an initial estimate
- Refine as additional data become available

# Methodology

- Derive two factors
  - Army: BCT Force Equivalent (BFE)
  - Marine Corps: RCT Force Equivalent (RFE)
- A “force equivalent” includes a combat element (BCT or RCT) and the number personnel needed to maximize the capabilities of the combat unit in a sustained campaign.
  - This is essentially a theater brigade or regiment “slice”
- Divide the total strength in a theater by the number of BCTs and/or RCTs in the theater
  - This version includes military personnel and contractors.
  - Civilian employees will be added later

# Data

- BCTs & RCTs:
  - Required Numbers from 4<sup>th</sup> Quarter of 2006 to 3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter of 2010
  - Actual Numbers from 2001/2003 to 3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter of 2010
- Military Personnel: Monthly strength for all years for both theaters
  - Source: Personnel Readiness Division, J-1
- Civilian Employees: Data have to be extracted
  - Source: JPERSTAT Monthly Reports
- Contractors:
  - Quarterly strength from 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 2008 to 3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter 2010.
  - Source: Program Support Directorate, OUSD(AT&L)
- Data has been extracted from JPERSTAT SECRET
  - Was downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED at that point

# Combat Zone Schematic

	Army BFE	Marine RFE	Allied BFE
Combat Increment	Brigade Combat Team	Regimental Combat Team	Allied brigade
Self Support Increment	Modular Support Brigades	Other MEB units	Allied support Units
Army Support Increment	Theater Sustainment Command	Army Support Units	Army Support Units

# Assumptions

- Army BCTs and Advise and Assist Brigades (AABs) are to be supported
  - Security Brigades are part of the support
- Marine Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs) are to be supported
  - Air combat elements in a MAGTF are support
  - A MEU with one battalion is one-third of an RCT
  - Except for Navy personnel in a MAGTF, Navy support is off-shore
- Air Force essentially supports itself
- Coast Guard personnel are included in Navy data

# Relationship of Army & Marine Factors

- Army BCT
  - Two infantry battalions
  - Average Strength of 3,600 military personnel
- Marine RCT
  - Three infantry battalions
  - Strength of 5,600 military personnel (including Sailors)
- It is assumed that an RFE = 1.5 BFEs



# DOD Civilians in CENTCOM AOR


(As of: 31 March 2010)

	OSD/DAs	USA	USN	USMC	USAF	TOTAL
Iraq		1,943	70		150	
Afghanistan		1,368	48			
Middle East		725	900			
	1,250	4,036	1,016	50	150	6,504


Civilian BFE for OIF:  $2,000/10 = 200$

# Operation Iraqi Freedom 2003 - 2010


# OIF – Military Personnel




# OIF – Military Personnel




# OIF Military Personnel 2007 – 2010




# OIF – Marine & Navy Personnel



# OIF – BCTs 2007 -2010




# OIF – Actual BVCTs







# OIF - Comparison of BCT Data



# OIF – BCT Equivalents 2007 - 2010




# OIF – Military BFE Ratios




# Operation Enduring Freedom Afghanistan


# OEF – Military Personnel




# OEF – Military Personnel 4/08 – 2/10



# OEF – BCTs




# OEF – New BCTs







# OEF – Comparison of BCT Data



# OEF – USMC RCTs




# OEF – BFE Equivalents




# Contractors


# CENTCOM Contractors 2008-2010




# CENTCOM Contractors by Source



# Contractors in Other CENTCOM 2008-2010




# Contractors in Iraq 2008-2010







# Iraq Contractors by Function




# OIF - Total Strength in Theater




# Proportion of Contractors in Iraq




# Contractors in Afghanistan 2008-2010




# OEF – Total Strength in Theater



# OEF – Mix of Personnel



# OIF – Combined BFE



# Interim Findings for OIF

Military Personnel	ARMY BFE	MARINE RFE*	ALLIED BRIGADE**
Combat Increment	3,600	5,600	4,000
Self-Support Increment	5,400	5,400	2,000
Army Support Increment		2,500	3,000
Total Military	9,000	13,500	9,000
Contractors***	11,000	16,500	11,000
Total Personnel	20,000	30,000	20,000

\* For inland operations only

\*\*Data for Allied Brigades are rough estimates


\*\*\* Assuming Demand for contractors is a direct function of the number of combat brigades or regiments



# OIF – Initial Findings

- An Army BFE for OIF for 2006 to 2010
  - 9,000 military personnel and 11,000 contractors
  - No allowance for Army support to Air Force
- A Marine RFE for OIF for 2006 to 2010
  - 13,500 military personnel and 16,500 contractors.
    - Includes Army support increment of 2,500 military personnel.
- Extent to which number of contractors depends on the number of BCTs & RCTs is unclear.

# OEF – Combined BFEs



# Interim Findings for OEF

Military Personnel	ARMY BFE	MARINE RFE	ALLIED BDE
Combat Increment	3,600	5,600	4,000
Self Support Increment	4,000	5,400	2,000
Army Support Increment		400	1,500
Total Military Personnel	7,600	11,400	7,600
Contractors	14,000	21,000	14,000
Total Personnel	21,600	32,400	21,600

# OEF – Interim Findings

- An Army BFE for OEF for 2006 – 2010
  - 7,600 military personnel
  - 14,000 contractors
- A Marine RFE for OEF for 2006 – 2010
  - 11,400 military personnel
    - Including 400 Army personnel
  - 21,000 contractors
- The current buildup suggests that number of contractors may be to some extent independent of number of BCTs
- The combined BFE and RFE for Afghanistan is 8% greater than the combined BFE and RFE for Iraq.

# Summary Findings

## **About Analysis and Data:**

- Data on current campaigns is hard to find
  - No central archive of data
  - Data require further refinement

## **Observations:**

- Large numbers of contractors have been used to augment military support personnel
- Total personnel per BCT/RCT was 8% greater for Afghanistan than for Iraq.
- Should include DOD and non-DOD civilian employees
- Unit rotations may be inefficient and more costly because of the overlap of units
- The BFEs and RFEs derived in the study appear to be reasonable